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Abstract. An unquestionably important biological question is whether human 
beings are the product of chance or of purpose in the evolutionary process. 
Charles Darwin did not accept purpose in biological evolution, a view not 
shared by his colleague Alfred Russel Wallace. The controversy has remained 
ever since, and while many experts argue against purpose in biological evo-
lution, many others defend it. This paper reflects on this biological and ethi-
cal problem, relating it to the possible existence of a plan that governs and 
shapes the evolution of living beings and that is ultimately responsible for the 
development of Homo sapiens. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 19.3 
(Autumn 2019): 000–000.
The dialogue between science and faith remains vigorous in the second decade of the 
twenty-first century. An important goal of this ongoing discussion is to assess whether 
human beings, and nature in general, rely on a higher intelligence for their creation and 
continued existence. In fact the fundamental issues in the dialogue between science and 
faith ultimately address the role that the existence of God plays in nature. These issues 
are (1) the origin of the universe, or in a broader conception, cosmology; (2) every-
thing related to the science of evolution and its ideological drift—evolutionism— 
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especially whether human beings are a random product of that process; (3) the need 
to reconcile original sin with the new biological concepts on the origin of the human 
species; (4) the existence of evil in the world, especially moral evil; and (5) every-
thing related to what has come to be called enhancement of the human condition, 
especially posthumanism, which ultimately tries to produce beings stripped of their 
own human nature by distorting and accelerating the evolutionary process.
This paper focuses on biological evolution and evolutionism, in particular on 
the possible existence of teleology in that evolutionary process. 
Traditional Theories of Biological Evolution
Biological evolution must answer two challenging principal questions: First, 
how does the evolutionary process explain the origin of matter? Second, how does 
evolution explain the development of human consciousness from matter? This transi-
tion clearly requires an ontological leap that is not explainable as a simple evolution 
of matter resulting from chance: “Matter, however much it is developed, cannot 
produce a single thought, nor can it understand itself.”1 To understand how evolu-
tionary theory addresses these concerns, we must look at its historical development.
Charles Darwin
Charles Darwin is the father of the theory that natural selection is the key to 
the entire evolutionary process of living beings. In his 1859 book On the Origin of 
Species, he states a simple version of the concept that would later be referred to as 
Darwinian evolution: “Descent with modification through natural selection,” where 
natural selection refers to the “preservation of favourable variations and the rejec-
tion of injurious variations.”2 Under this theory, the fittest prevail, and the weakest 
are eliminated. 
Alfred Russel Wallace
Another prominent figure in the field of biological evolution was Alfred Russel 
Wallace, who held a view contrary to Darwin’s regarding the mechanisms of human 
evolution. Wallace argued that natural selection does not seem sufficient to explain 
the origin of the human species, so a nonmaterial agent must have intervened in its 
genesis. According to him, humans would not have become what they are if only 
natural selection were taken into account, given that this process promotes only useful 
traits. Thus, in his opinion, human evolution required a certain divine intervention 
to get where it is today.3 
1. Alfonso Aguiló, “Evolución: Bien ¿pero dónde?,” Fluvium, accessed October 28, 
2019, http://www.fluvium.org/textos/etica/eti944.htm. All translations are the author’s unless 
otherwise stated.
2. Charles Darwin, On the Origins of Species (London: John Murray, 1859), chaps. 4, 
14, Project Gutenberg, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1228/1228-h/1228-h.htm.
3. Andrew Berry, “Wallace, el evolucionista radical,” Investigación y ciencia no. 445 
(October 2013): 41.
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Modern Synthesis
From the 1920s to the 1960s, a set of unified principles was developed for evo-
lutionary theory, which gave rise to what has come to be called a modern synthesis.4 
This model provides the theoretical framework for current evolutionary biology. 
It brings together the contributions of experimental genetic studies, the theory of 
population genetics, and natural, systematic, paleontological, and ecological popula-
tion studies. It concludes that evolution is the result of the interaction of two main 
forces of different natures: mutation, which generates a new genetic and phenotypic 
variation, and natural selection.
The ideas at the core of modern synthesis are that (1) evolution at all levels 
results from continuous changes in populations as described by population genetics;5 
(2) genetic mutation is the result of random processes—that is, in control processes 
or systems, mutations do not occur in a way that benefits the organisms; and (3) the 
main influence that directs the evolution of the organism is natural selection, which is 
not subject to any control process or system either. Without doubt modern synthesis 
is essentially defined by its assertion that there is no mechanism of purpose behind 
the selection itself. This is supported by Richard Dawkins, who says that the modern 
synthesis of evolution is a mechanistic theory of population genetics and random 
mutation that excludes all purpose.6 This opinion is shared by Jacques Monod, who 
explains that “the universe was not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man. 
Our number came up in the Monte Carlo game.”7 
Synthetic Theory of Evolution
Evolutionary theory was redefined in 1930, combining the concept of Darwin-
ian natural selection with that of Mendelian inheritance. This theory was developed 
especially by Theodosius Dobzhansky, “who with a master hand synthesised popu-
lation genetics and data on the variation and genetic differences between species.”8 
Dobzhansky joined Ernest Mayr and George Simpson to definitively articulate the 
synthetic theory of evolution. In the opinion of Mariano Artigas and Daniel Turbón, 
their model is characterized by the interrelationship of five different factors: (1) muta-
tion, or random change in DNA; (2) genetic recombination of DNA; (3) genetic drift, 
or random change in the frequency of genetic variants, from one generation to another 
when the population is small; (4) migration, which incorporates individual carriers 
4. Jonathan Bartlett, “Evolutionary Teleonomy as a Unifying Principle for the Extended 
Evolutionary Synthesis,” Bio-complexity 2017.2 (November 27, 2017): 1–7, doi: 10.5048 
/BIO-C.2017.2.c.
5. Douglas J. Futuyma, “Can Modern Evolutionary Theory Explain Macroevolution?,” 
in Macroevolution: Explanation, Interpretation and Evidence, ed. Emanuele Serrelli and 
Nathalie Gontier (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2015), 29–86.
6. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
7. Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of 
Modern Biology (New York: Vintage, 1971), 146.
8. Mariano Artigas and Daniel Borrega Turbón, El origen del hombre: Ciencia, filosofía 
y religión (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2007): 47.
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of different genetic variations in the reproductive group; and (5) natural selection, 
or differential reproduction of some organisms over others, caused by the environ-
ment. In this theory, as in Darwin’s, evolution occurs through the slow and inexorable 
accumulation of small variations caused by the aforementioned mechanisms. 
Punctuated Equilibrium
This theory of the slow accumulation of mutations was opposed in the 1970s, 
in particular by Stephen Jay Gould, who proposed an alternative: the punctuated 
equilibrium theory. On this view the emergence of the main lineages of living organ-
isms occurred abruptly or in leaps. Certainly, after such leaps there may have been 
periods—even very long ones—of relative equilibrium and slow evolution. 
Extended Evolutionary Synthesis
However, in the last decade the need to rethink the modern synthesis of bio-
logical evolution has arisen, and the extended evolutionary synthesis proposed by 
Massimo Pigliucci and Gerd Müller in 2010 has been gaining momentum.9 A funda-
mental characteristic in the change from modern synthesis to extended evolutionary 
synthesis is the inclusion of purpose in evolutionary processes, which requires the 
existence of a plan in them, something that was not considered in the Darwinian 
theory of evolution.
According to Jonathan Bartlett extended synthesis is characterized basically 
by (1) “contingency as a more primary actor in determining possible mutations”; 
(2) “shifting focus from individual genes to gene networks”; (3) “various new kinds 
of inheritance, including transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, niche inheritance, 
and cultural inheritance”; (4) “the influence of developmental biology on the theory 
of evolution”; and (5) “the analysis of evolvability itself.”10 
This interpretation is supported by a 1968 article by Japanese geneticist Motoo 
Kimura, in which he expounded his neutral theory of biological evolution. He tried 
to explain the changes produced in the genome over time, which eventually gave 
rise to the evolution of the species of living beings. Antonio Barbadilla and col-
leagues summarize his conclusion: “A large part of the genetic variation observed 
in populations and between species is due to the fluctuation and random fixation in 
the genome of neutral genetic variants. The fact that a variant is neutral does not 
mean that it lacks biological function, but that it is equivalent to others in the face of 
natural selection. . . . When two or more variants are neutral, they are equally effec-
tive for the survival and reproduction of the individual. The appearance by mutation 
of a neutral variant is undetectable for selection and only chance will determine its 
survival or extinction.”11 
 9. Massimo Pigliucci and Gerd B. Müller, eds., Evolution, the Extended Synthesis 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010).
10. Bartlett, “Evolutionary Teleonomy,” 2.
11. Antonio Barbadilla, Sònia Casillas, and Alfredo Ruiz, “La teoría neutralista de la 
evolución molecular, medio siglo después,” Investigación y ciencia no. 509 (February 2019): 
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In 1983 Kimura wrote The Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution, which 
“contributed decisively to the establishment of the neutral theory as a paradigm of 
molecular evolution.”12 
Chance, Perspective, and Purpose
As already mentioned, Darwin proposed that chance plays a decisive role 
in the evolutionary process. Essentially, evolutionary changes happen exclusively 
through the concurrence of independent causal lines. At a symposium hosted by 
Pope Benedict XVI, Peter Schuster explained what chance means in this context: 
“There are by far fewer investigations, if any at all, into the ‘chance’ in the expres-
sions ‘chance variations,’ or simply into ‘chance.’ Most often biologists speak as 
though everyone understood what is meant by chance. Chance, for biologists, seems 
to mean ultimately: arbitrary causes, first these, then those, but in any case always 
the absence of any sort of plan or design, of any goal-oriented activity and intention. 
This is considered to be downright axiomatic.”13 
However, it should be remembered that chance exists only for human beings, 
who are ignorant of some of the causes that concur in the realization of an event. 
The concept of chance does not exist for God,14 who is aware of all the causal ele-
ments that occur to reach an end. Consequently, He is aware of the final result of 
those actions. Chance is necessary only when considering evolution from the per-
spective of contingent beings such as ourselves. However, there is no chance from 
the perspective of an omniscient being who has knowledge of all causes. Therefore, 
considering chance as an element that defines biological evolution does not exclude 
divine action. If God acts through secondary causes, which appear to be chance from 
our perspective, then it is intelligible to posit purpose in evolution.15 
Teleological Evolution
The possibility of purpose in evolution is articulated in teleological evolution. 
Francisco Ayala provides a succinct description of this theory: “Evolution can also 
be considered as a natural process through which God brings living species into 
existence in accordance with His own plan.” Ayala goes on to explain that this is 
in line with the opinion of Artigas and Turbón, who argue that “the combination of 
52–59; and Motoo Kimura, “Evolutionary Rate at the Molecular Level,” Nature 217.5129 
(February 17, 1968): 624–626, doi: 10.1038/217624a0.
12. Barbadilla et al., “La teoría neutralista,” 52–59; and Motoo Kimura, The Neutral 
Theory of Molecular Evolution (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
13. Peter Schuster, “Evolution and Design: A Review of the State of the Art in the 
Theory of Evolution,” in Creation and Evolution: A Conference with Pope Benedict XVI in 
Castel Gandolfo (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 55.
14. See, for example, Keith Ward, God, Chance and Necessity (Oxford: Oneworld, 
1996).
15. Such an argument depends on the truth of the following claims: (1) God exists, 
(2) God is omniscient, (3) God acts through secondary causality, and (4) this introduces 
purpose. 
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chance and necessity, variation and selection, together with the potentialities for 
self-organisation, can be easily contemplated as the path used by God to promote 
the process of evolution.”16 
Similarly, Héctor Velázquez says that we cannot discard the inclusion of teleo-
logical mechanisms in the development of living beings toward an end. Likewise, 
teleology makes reference to the fact that there are directionality, cooperativity, and 
functionality in living beings: even the “behaviours of the individual cells in our 
bodies are, in a certain sense, intelligent and deliberate, directed knowingly towards 
ends that satisfy their needs, so that the existence of a purpose or project is essential 
for the very definition of living beings.” This enables us to say that “there is purpose 
and teleology at the level of every individual organisms.”17
However, these teleological proposals have been—and still are—widely con-
tested by leading evolutionary biologists, who are opposed to including the concept 
of purpose in biological evolutionary processes. As Luis Alonso contends, “One 
of the aims of logical empiricism was to eradicate the final cause from the field of 
meta-science. Philosophers and scientists have remained committed to that work, 
particularly in the domain of biology,”18 which “is supposed to remain free of teleol-
ogy, as a computer is supposed to remain virus-free.”19 
Thus Dawkins says that “the theory of natural selection provides a mechanistic, 
causal account of how living things came to look as if they had been designed for 
a purpose.”20 Likewise, Gould says that humans are not the result of an evolution 
directed toward their appearance on earth, but that evolution is a sum of contingencies: 
a process in which chance plays a fundamental role. Hence evolution is essentially an 
unpredictable process: “Humans arose, rather, as a fortuitous and contingent outcome 
of thousands of linked events, any one of which could have occurred differently and 
sent history on an alternative pathway that would not have led to consciousness.”21 
Nevertheless, it seems evident that all biological activity, even at the molecu-
lar level, seems to be intentional and targeted. Everything seems to lead toward the 
fulfillment of the obvious purposes of the organism. Robert Trivers states that “even 
the humblest creature, say, a virus, appears organized to do something; it acts as if 
16. Francisco J. Ayala, La teoría de la evolución. De Darwin a los últimos avances de 
la genética (Madrid: Temas de Hoy Madrid, 1994), 106, 147.
17. Héctor Velázquez Fernández, “Naturaleza y finalidad,” Investigación y ciencia 
no. 464 (May 2015): 50–51.
18. Luis Alonso, “Ciencia y teleología,” Investigación y ciencia no. 507 (December 
2018): 91–92. See also Michael Ruse, On Purpose (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2018).
19. Schuster, “Evolution and Design,” 55.
20. Richard Dawkins, “Replicators and Vehicles,” in Current Problems in Sociobiol-
ogy, ed. Kings College Sociobiology Group (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 45.
21. Stephen Jay Gould, “La evolución de la vida en la tierra,” Investigación y ciencia 
no. 219 (December 1994): 54–61.
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it is trying to achieve some purpose.”22 Larry Arnhart holds that “Darwin’s biology 
does not deny—rather, it reaffirms—the immanent teleology displayed in the striv-
ing of each living being to fulfil its specific ends. . . . Reproduction, growth, feeding, 
healing, courtship, parental care for the young—these and many other activities of 
organisms are goal-directed.”23 
Evolution tends toward “increasing complexity,” which we clearly observe but 
cannot explain. Biology can describe the phenomenon, but philosophy of nature and 
metaphysics are required to describe how it occurs.24 These observations raise the ques-
tion, Does teleology require the existence of a higher intelligence? In answer, Artigas 
says that such a being must exist as the primary cause of physical existence, a being 
who directs but does not determine nature. The divine plan then is realized through 
creativity, contingency, and chance at the natural, species, and individual levels.25 
Teleonomic Evolution
In 1958 Colin Pittendrigh introduced the term teleonomy to replace teleology 
and thereby to avoid the need to accept the action of a higher intelligence in the 
evolutionary process of living things.26 This essentially refers to the fact that the 
possible plan that will direct the development of natural phenomena is included in 
the structure of the system itself.27 Mayr supported this concept shortly thereafter.28 
According to Bartlett, the concept of teleonomy refers to two fundamental facts: 
(1) “Organisms exhibit purposiveness because of teleonomy,” and (2) “evolution 
lacks any teleonomic driver.”29 For him teleonomy seems to play a central, unifying 
role in the extended evolutionary synthesis. 
Stephen Talbott summarizes E. S. Russell’s observation that animal behavior 
indicates an intrinsic self-directedness, which is not explainable by mechanistic 
theories alone: 
The instinctiveness of the animal’s behaviour does not make it merely mecha-
nistic, directed only by “the physical and chemical stimuli impinging upon the 
sense organs of the animal.” Not even “mechanical” reflexes can be understood 
22. Robert Trivers, Social Evolution (Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin-Cummings, 1985), 
5, original emphasis.
23. Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), 245.
24. Rafael Jordana, La ciencia en el horizonte de una razón ampliada. La evolución y el 
hombre a la luz de las ciencias biológicas y metabólicas (Madrid: Unión Editorial, 2016), 150.
25. Mariano Artigas, Ciencia y religión. Conceptos fundamentales (Pamplona: EUNSA, 
2007), 42–46, 68.
26. C. S. Pittendrigh, “Adaptation, Natural Selection, and Behavior,” in Behavior and 
Evolution, ed. Anne Roe and George Gaylord Simpson (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1958), 390–416.
27. Ayala, Teoría de la evolución, 147.
28. Ernst Mayr, “Cause and Effect in Biology,” Science 134.3489 (November 10, 
1961): 1501–1506.
29. Bartlett, “Evolutionary Teleonomy,” 4.
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in merely mechanical terms: “There is no such thing as pure reflex action in 
normal behaviour; all so-called reflexes are parts of co-ordinated and gener-
ally ‘purposive’ or directive actions, and they cannot be understood until their 
relation to the objective aim of the whole action is known.” . . . Such behaviour 
shows us, as Russell puts it, that “the end is more constant than the means 
of attaining it.” . . . It requires an active intelligence capable of improvising 
responses within an infinite variety of unforeseeable circumstances in order 
for the end to be achieved.30
In January 2019 the journal Science published an interesting study that analyzed 
the genome of one hundred fifty Icelanders. The authors claim that they compiled 
the most detailed map of the human genome to date. Thirty-five genomic variants 
were identified that affect the rate of genetic recombinations. The study also showed 
that new mutations were fifty times more likely where the paternal and maternal 
chromatid crossovers occured than at recombination sites elsewhere on the genome.31 
Summarizing the relationship between teleology and teleonomy, Velázquez 
says that teleonomy and teleology can be reconciled through secondary causality. 
The tendentiality and finite purposes observable in nature are the secondary causes 
through which “an invaluable materialised rationality” operates toward an overarch-
ing final goal.32 This underlying teleology is enigmatic to beings inside the system, 
especially since they cannot ask the creative intelligence behind the system about its 
purpose. It seems that the concept of teleonomy is widely accepted. Even Monod, the 
primary proponent of chance in evolutionary processes, dedicated extensive sections 
of Chance and Necessity to a reflection on teleonomy. 
Biological Altruism
In the context of evolutionary biology, biological altruism can be defined as 
an organism’s behavior that “benefits other organisms at a cost to itself, [whereby it] 
reduces the number of offspring it is likely to produce itself, but boosts the number 
that other organisms are likely to produce.”33 This concept is directly related to the 
concept of reproductive fitness. Common examples include insects that care for a 
queen but do not reproduce on their own and birds that help protect and feed other 
birds’ chicks.34 Explaining altruism is a fundamental problem for evolutionary biology. 
30. Stephen L. Talbott, “Evolution and the Purpose of Life,” New Atlantis no. 51 
(Winter 2017): 67, 68, citing E. S. Russell, original emphasis.
31. Bjarni V. Halldorsson et al., “Characterizing Mutagenic Effects of Recombination 
through a Sequence-Level Genetic Map,” Science 363.6425 (January 25, 2019): 1–10, doi: 
10.1126/science.aau1043.
32. Héctor Velázquez Fernández, private message to author, February 21, 2019.
33. Samir Okasha, “Biological Altruism,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, revised July 21, 2013, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/altruism-biological/.
34. Ibid. See also Jacobus J. Boomsma, “Kin Selection versus Sexual Selection: Why 
the Ends Do Not Meet,” Current Biology 17.16 (August 21, 2007): R673–R683, doi: 10.1016/j 
.cub.2007.06.033; Charlie K. Cornwallis et al., “Promiscuity and the Evolutionary Transition to 
Complex Societies,” Nature 466.7309 (August 19, 2010): 969–972, doi: 10.1038/nature09335; 
and Ben J. Hatchwell, Philippa R. Gullett, and Mark J. Adams, “Helping in Cooperatively 
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Given the Darwinian idea of survival of the fittest, how can we explain individuals’ 
engaging in a behavior that reduces their own fitness, while increasing that of others?35 
Typically, biological altruism describes conscious and unconscious social behav-
ior. However, there is some indication that it can occur at the genetic and cellular levels 
as well. For example, in the progression from unicellular to multicellular organisms, 
some cells “removed” themselves from the germline “to specialize in various survival-
related functions.” This change indicates “an adaptive strategy to enhance survival 
at an immediate cost to reproduction.”36 Importantly, this indicates that biological 
altruism may be operative in various functional and develomental contexts.
Nevertheless, biological altruism undeniably seems to be present in some 
biological processes. One notable aspect of nonhuman animal reproduction is the 
apparent passivity of the female in coitus. It seems that her attitude is simply to remain 
motionless to enable her to be mounted by the male.37 This is in clear contrast with 
the active participation of the female in human coitus, especially in sharing sexual 
pleasure with the male. It is surprising that in the evolutionary process of mammals, 
there is such a marked difference in the physiological reproductive mechanism 
between nonrational and rational mammals, even among species as close as irratio-
nal hominids and Homo sapiens. One may ask what is the telos, or purpose, of this 
evolutionary process. It could be a mechanism aimed at ensuring the continuation 
of the species, because it is easy to assume the difficulties to which that continua-
tion would be subject if a human woman were not encouraged to participate in the 
reproductive act by enjoying a sexual pleasure as intense as that of the male. 
Given the association between teleonomy and teleology described above, could 
a form of somatic biological altruism be the secondary cause in a teleological plan, 
which would not be indicated by the environment, let alone conceivable, when the 
evolutionary change occurred? A possible example may be related to the existence of 
periods of infertility in the female reproductive cycle among humans. There appears 
to be little doubt that during the entire evolutionary period of the human species, the 
demographic circumstances have changed substantially. In fact it can be said that 
in its initial stages, and during almost all the years of its evolutionary development 
until the mid-twentieth century, there was no risk of excessive demographic growth 
of our species. Thus women having periods of infertility within their reproductive 
cycle would not have an explicit purpose. The more births, the better to maintain the 
species. Why do these periods of infertility exist? Why has evolution created them? 
Breedding Long-Tailed Tits: A Test of Hamilton’s Rule,” Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences 369.1642 (May 19, 2014): 1–9, doi: 
10.1098/rstb.2013.0565. 
35. Asher Leeks and Stuart West, “Altruism in a Virus,” Nature Microbiology 4.6 (June 
2019): 910–911, doi: 10.1038/s41564-019-0463-0.
36. Aurora M. Nedelcu and Richard E. Michod, “The Evolutionary Origin of an Altru-
istic Gene,” Molecular Biology and Evolution 23.8 (August 2006): 1460, doi: org/10.1093 
/molbev/msl016.
37. L. S. Katz and T. J. McDonald, “Sexual Behavior of Farm Animals,” Theriogenology 
38.2 (August 1992): 239–253, doi: 10.1016/0093-691X(92)90233-H.
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Could this have any relation to an altruistic end not related to reproductive fitness? 
Could it be aimed at resolving demographic needs that could present at a certain time 
in the evolution of the species?
Since the mid-twentieth century, perhaps prompted by the decline in mortal-
ity (especially infant mortality), the lengthening of the average life span, and other 
factors, the possibility has been raised that there is excessive growth of the human 
population. Therefore, the fact that women have a period of infertility within their 
reproductive cycle could be useful to regulate that hypothetical excessive growth of 
the human species, because those periods of infertility could be useful to space, or 
even suppress, the birth of more individuals of the species. But if this biological cir-
cumstance, which may now be convenient and even necessary, were not programmed 
throughout the evolutionary period of the human species, it could not occur now.
That is, a biological condition—the cyclical infertility of women—that may be 
useful at present had to be programmed from the start of the Homo sapiens species 
and develop throughout its evolutionary process. It was started and perpetuated at a 
time when it was clearly not necessary, so that it could be applied at this time. This 
evolutionary process that has propitiated the existence of periods of infertility within 
the reproductive cycle of women could be another example of biological altruism.
Evolution and Creation in  
the Confines of Knowledge
Certainly, one important aspect of the dialogue between science and faith 
with respect to biological evolution is whether there is a teleological component of 
evolutionary processes. In addition, does a higher intelligence govern it or, at least, 
imprint it on the very nature of living beings? 
Alejandro Llano sums up the topic superbly: 
If there is a cosmological and biological evolution with sense, in order to 
explain it radically, i.e. metaphysically, it must be referred to a creative intel-
ligence. And, in turn, this creative intelligence, although it has created the 
world freely, must have created a world ordered to an end and, therefore, 
purposeful. What really exists is creation as a stable metaphysical condition 
of material things that evolve precisely because they have been created with 
sense and purpose and are, therefore, guided by a wise ordering providence. 
The basic conceptual failure common to both radical views is forgetting the 
teleological nature of the physical world. According to this finalist conception, 
the things of the physical world are not exhausted in their mere facticity, in their 
crude reality, but they have an intelligibility: a sense that is manifested in that 
its function is not arbitrary or casual, but is intrinsically oriented towards the 
achievement of a purpose. The teleological view of the world considers that 
physical things are not formless fragments of matter, but are endowed with a 
nature, so they are subject to their own actions that are directed towards their 
own end, i.e. natural. The trivialisation of finalism, its simplistic presentation 
as a physical explanation, earned rejection by modern mechanicism on the 
charge of anthropomorphism, that is, of attributing some kind of intentions that 
only man can have to physical or biological activities. But none of that sug-
gests the teleological concept; particularly because it is not a theory to provide 
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specific physical explanations, but a metaphysical concept of the world and 
man for whom all reality is intelligible and is endowed with meaning, even 
though we do not always know precisely what that nature is that gives each 
thing its own purpose.
The rejection of teleology by modern mechanicism has already seen its histori-
cal exhaustion. The teleological concept of nature allows us to understand the 
emergence of the new as an update of potentialities ordered to an end. Unlike 
mechanicism, the teleological concept of nature does not understand physical 
reality as an undifferentiated fabric, but as a differentiated order, with a single 
sense and purpose that is given by a transcendent intelligence. Only thus from 
a metaphysical concept of evolutionary creation can the meaning of biological 
evolution be understood.38
An unquestionably important biological question is whether human beings, 
as a result of biological evolution, are the product of chance or of purpose in the 
evolutionary process. This double possibility raises an objective metaphysical 
problem: is there teleology or teleonomy in biological evolution? In the first case, 
nature, following the laws of evolution, directs the development of living beings 
until the emergence of Homo sapiens. In the second case, an intelligence external to 
the evolutionary process somehow directed it or, at least, caused living organisms 
to have a self-regulation program that directs their development to a specific end.
Overall, compelling evidence suggests that biological evolution develops 
according to an end, and consequently, that there must be a higher intelligence that 
somehow programs this evolutionary process.
38. Alejandro Llano, “Evolución y creación, en los confines del conocimiento,” in 
Carlos Marmelada, Emilio Palafox, and Alejandro Llano, En busca de nuestros orígenes: 
Biología y transcendencia del hombre a la luz de los últimos descubrimientos (Madrid: 
Ediciones Rialp, 2017), 29–41. 

